The Birth of the Pao An Tui Chinese Militia

The night was increasingly tense for the Chinese people in Tangerang. It was May 1946, the days when revolution was raging in Indonesia, and rumors were circulating that Laskar Rakyat (the People's Army) would burn down Tangerang, which was known as a vital and strategic buffer zone connecting Jakarta and other areas in the West. Not surprisingly, both the Dutch and the Indonesians tried their best to control the area.

The Chinese residents of Tangerang, who had been worried about their safety, were able to breathe a sigh of relief because the plan didn't proceed. However, that situation only lasted temporarily. On the evening of June 2, 1946, a group of Laskar Rakyat armed with pointed bamboo, carbines, pistols, and samurai, attacked the Chinese residents in West Tangerang. Houses and shops were destroyed, and all their possessions were robbed.

In an instant, the riots spread to various areas in Tangerang. According to the Star Weekly report, June 16, 1946, as many as 40-50 villages were destroyed; 1,200 houses were razed to the ground; more than 700 Chinese were killed, 200 of them women and children; 200 Chinese were missing; and material losses were more than 7 million rupiah. Not to mention the thousands of refugees who decided to leave Tangerang in search of safety.

The incident left the Chinese residents of Tangerang disappointed. They realized that the protection of the Republican government could not reach out to remote areas. Although Sukarno, Sjahrir, and Natsir strongly condemned the Tangerang incident, according to Tsiang Chia Tung, the Chinese Consul General in Batavia, the Republic was seen as taking no significant action to protect the ethnic Chinese from further violence.

The lack of legal guarantees during the revolutionary period was a factor in the spread of the riots to several cities. After the Tangerang incident, anti-Chinese incidents also occurred in the cities of Bagan Siapi-api, Palembang, Bekasi, Cilimus, Jember, Madiun, Malang, and several more.

Chinese in the Throes of Revolution

The Indonesian Revolution of 1945-1950 was a complex period in Indonesian history. In the article Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta 1945-1950, Soejatno and Benedict Anderson mentioned that the Indonesian revolution was not only filled with the decolonization process, but also of social and political friction between classes.

During the revolutionary period, violent events often tainted the struggle in various places, especially in Java and Sumatra. Indonesia at that time was trapped in chaotic conditions. Kidnappings, disappearances, shootings, robberies, and murders occurred almost every day.

Sartono Kartodirdjo in an article entitled Wajah Revolusi Indonesia Dipandang dari Perspektivisme Struktural (The Face of the Indonesian Revolution Viewed from the Perspective of Structuralism), said that the Indonesian revolution played a role in creating divisions between groups, as a result of the crisis and political tension that was increasingly tapered due to Dutch colonialism. According to Sartono, the state at that time was unable to guarantee the safety of its population, especially those from minority groups.

Under Dutch colonial law, the Chinese were categorized as Foreign Easterners or Vreemde Oosterlingen, which also includes Arabs and Indians. They were separated from the Europeans who occupied the top position and the natives who were grouped at the bottom level. This racial categorization played a role in creating barriers between ethnic groups in Indonesia. Ironically, this discrimination was passed down until it reached its peak during the revolutionary period, when thousands of Chinese were subjected to violence based on economic motives and accusations that they were collaborating with the Dutch.

In a chapter of his book, Anti-Chinese Actions in Southeast Asia: In Search of Causes and Solutions, Leo Suryadinata mentions that the revolutionary period was the beginning of the first anti-Chinese movement after the proclamation of independence. Meanwhile, Anne van der Veer wrote in her thesis entitled The Pao An Tui in Medan that the newly established Republic of Indonesia was unable to fully protect ethnic Chinese from attacks by groups that used the revolution spirit for their own interests.

The Emergence of Pao An Tui

The events of late 1945 and early 1946 inevitably caused anxiety among the Chinese community. The lack of security during that chaotic revolutionary period encouraged them to take their own steps to protect themselves.

Tsiang Chia Tung then proposed to the Republic that the Chinese be allowed to form their own defense organization. Through Radio-Batavia, Tsiang informed President Sukarno and Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin about the plan to form Pao An Tui (Chinese Defense Front or PAT) which would be fully financed by the Chinese community.

The proposal was discussed at the Chung Hua Tsung Hui (Central Chinese Association) conference, August 24-26, 1947, which was attended by CHTH representatives from all over Indonesia (except CHTH Yogyakarta and Solo). The conference agreed on the establishment of Pao An Tui on August 28, 1947. In fact, PAT had already been established in Medan in December 1946, a few months before the return of the Dutch to Medan. However, intensive discussions on the function, structure, and purpose of the organization became more settled and focused a year later.

The main purpose of establishing the PAT was to protect the property and lives of Chinese people, in addition to maintaining security and order in areas considered vulnerable. The regulation of this semi-military organization was stipulated in Ordinance No. 516 dated 12 September 1947. In addition, the PAT also took the initiative to organize periodic donations for Chinese victims of violence.

The Republic initially disagreed with the idea of forming this organization on the grounds that it was still able to maintain the safety of Chinese people in the Republic's territory. However, in the end the Republican government gave permission, on the condition that it did not intervene in the Indonesian struggle. The Republican government even considered donating weapons, although it is not known whether this action was actually realized.

An Advantage for the Dutch

Simon Hendrik Spoor, commander-in-chief of the Dutch army in Indonesia, saw the emergence of the PAT as a positive sign. Spoor tried to exploit the strained relationship between the ethnic Chinese and the Republican government by appealing to the sympathies of the Chinese who were members of the PAT. The Dutch military agreed to provide the PAT with uniforms, weapons, and military training in Cimahi, Bandung. The Dutch also utilized a handful of PAT members to carry out various military operations and even allowed PAT members to hold weapons.

However, on several occasions, clashes also happened between the PAT and the Dutch police, who were perceived as trying to intervene in the internal affairs of the PAT organization. According to Anne van der Veer, the PAT was never fully under Dutch control. The PAT continued to grow as an independent organization that operated according to the rules, methods, and principles of the organization.

However, it cannot be denied that there were some people in the PAT who took advantage of their position for personal gain. According to Roel Frakking in his article Who Wants to Cover Everything, Covers Nothing: The Organization of Indigenous Security Forces in Indonesia, 1945-50, some PAT members were also used by Chinese capital owners as plantation security guards.

For funding, PAT's operational costs came from voluntary donations from Chinese individuals or families who were willing to pay more for protection. Other funds came from various charitable activities such as night markets, sports activities, music performances, and movie screenings that were held regularly. After a few months, PAT branches had spread to all major cities in Java and Sumatra, with the exception of Yogyakarta and Solo, as the Republican government argued that it could still guarantee the safety of the Chinese community in these two areas. By February 1949, more than 30 PAT branches had been established throughout Java and Sumatra.

The Two Sides of Pao An Tui

The emergence of PAT brought fresh air to the Chinese community. They eagerly provided assistance such as tables, cooking utensils, and cutlery, to the PAT military barracks located at Mangga Besar 47, Jakarta. However, there were also some Chinese people who opposed the idea of forming the PAT. The voice of opposition came from Tjoa Sik Ien and Tan Ling Djie, members of the Indonesian Socialist Party. They considered the PAT to be ridden by Kuomintang and Dutch political interests. The PAT was also considered to have deviated from its original purpose because in its later development it was often used by foreign parties to achieve certain goals.

The establishment of the PAT also led to polemics among Indonesian intellectuals. Noto Soeroto, a Javanese aristocrat who spent most of his life in the Netherlands, thought that the PAT could worsen relations between Chinese and native people. He feared that the PAT would misuse its military power to retaliate against Indonesian militias. However, a pro voice came from Soegardo Poerbakawatja, one of the administrators of the Hollandsch-Inlandsche School (HIS). The emergence of the PAT was a natural response from the Chinese, considering that no one dared to guarantee the safety of Chinese lives and property. Therefore, the Chinese also had the right to defend their property and lives, especially during the uncertain revolutionary period.

The PAT was actually formed as a temporary organization, meaning that when the situation had improved for the Chinese, the PAT would automatically lose its function and role. In March 1949, CHTH decided to dissolve all PATs in Java and Sumatra. However, many PATs had already been disbanded in various places because the overall situation was considered safer. The PAT no longer received financial support from Chinese conglomerates, as they considered conditions in the big cities to be relatively safe.

According to Nasrul Hamdani in the book Komunitas Cina di Medan (Chinese Community in Medan), after the PAT was disbanded, many of its former members scattered. Unlike former members of Indonesian paramilitary organizations who were later offered to join the TNI, none of the PAT members received the same privilege. The prejudice that the PAT was an anti-Republican organization is suspected to be the reason behind this treatment.

The author is an alumnus of Leiden University, the Netherlands.